Re-conceiving nonhuman animal knowledge through contemporary primate cognitive studies by Fenton, Andrew
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Re-conceiving nonhuman animal knowledge through contemporary primate 
cognitive studies. 
Author: Andrew Fenton, PhD 
Affiliation: Novel Tech Ethics, Department of Bioethics, Dalhousie University. 
Address: Novel Tech Ethics, 1234 Le Marchant Street, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 
NS, Canada, B3H 3P7. 
Email: atf@dal.ca. 
 
1 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I examine two claims that support the thesis that chimpanzees are 
substantive epistemic subjects.  First, I defend the claim that chimpanzees are evidence 
gatherers (broadly construed to include the capacity to gather and use evidence). In the 
course of showing that this claim is probably true I will also show that, in being evidence 
gatherers, chimpanzees engage in a recognizable epistemic activity. Second, I defend the 
claim that chimpanzees achieve a degree of epistemic success while engaging in 
epistemic activity.   
Typically humans qualify as substantive epistemic subjects. Again, typically, 
knowledge plays an integral role in intentional human behaviour. As a consequence of 
defending the claims that chimpanzees are evidence gatherers and achieve a degree of 
epistemic success while engaging in such epistemic activities, I will also have shown how 
knowledge plays an integral role in intentional chimpanzee behaviour. 
The importance of these arguments does not wholly reside in the significance of 
knowledge explaining some chimpanzee behaviour. Treatments of animal knowledge in 
the literature tend to go in one of two directions: either the treatment embraces reliabilism 
and so construes animal knowledge as reliably produced true beliefs (or, if not beliefs, the 
relevant analogue for non-linguistic animals), or it embraces an anthropocentric stance 
that treats animals as knowers only when they find themselves behaving in circumstances 
that, were it true of humans, would imply the presence of causally efficacious knowledge. 
What I offer here is another way of understanding non-linguistic animals, in this case 
chimpanzees, as knowers.  
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Introduction 
A substantive epistemic subject has the capacity to engage in activities of an epistemic 
nature governed by rules or standards (henceforth referred to as epistemic activities) 
adopted, or learnt, by the individual in question and held in common with her social 
group, or so I will hold. This account implicates, among other things, a capacity to gather 
(and use) evidence and the ability to achieve a degree of epistemic success. In this paper I 
defend two claims that support the thesis that chimpanzees are substantive epistemic 
subjects.1 First, I defend the claim that chimpanzees are evidence gatherers (broadly 
construed to include the capacity to gather and use evidence). In the course of showing 
that this claim is probably true I will also show that, in being evidence gatherers, 
chimpanzees engage in a recognizable epistemic activity. Second, I defend the claim that 
chimpanzees achieve a degree of epistemic success while engaging in epistemic activity.  
At face value the implications following from my contentions that chimpanzees 
are evidence gatherers and enjoy a degree of epistemic success are modest—just as 
human knowledge plays an integral role in intentional human behaviour, so chimpanzee 
knowledge also plays an integral role in intentional chimpanzee behaviour. However, this 
way of seeing chimpanzees reveals a path for re-examining animal knowledge. 
Treatments of animal knowledge in the philosophical literature tend to go in one of two 
directions: either the treatment embraces reliabilism and so construes animal knowledge 
as reliably produced true beliefs (or, if not beliefs, the relevant analogue for non-
linguistic animals) (see Goldman 1976; Kornblith 1999; Sosa 1991; Steup 2003), or it 
embraces an anthropocentric stance that treats animals as knowers only when they find 
themselves behaving in circumstances that, were it true of humans, would imply the 
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presence of causally efficacious knowledge (see Davidson 1982; Russell 1948/56).2 It 
should be noted that neither of these accounts imply that the relevant nonhuman animals 
are substantive epistemic subjects as it is characterized here. It is difficult to determine 
the view of knowledge informing its ascription to nonhuman animals in comparative 
psychology, ethology, and primatology. Kornblith has suggested that a reliabilist account 
of knowledge will capture the sense of knowledge assumed in these animal sciences 
(Kornblith 2002: 53-62). I suspect, however, that a more active cognitive account of 
nonhuman knowledge, one that presents many nonhuman animals as knowers on their 
own terms, as it were, better accords with what many comparative psychologists, 
ethologists, and primatologists are ascribing to their nonhuman subjects.3 What I offer 
here is a way of understanding non-linguistic animals, in this case chimpanzees, as 
knowers in this more active sense. 
Terms of the discussion 
Before proceeding further I should clarify what I mean by evidence gathering and 
epistemic activity. For the purposes of my discussion, to be an evidence gatherer (and 
user) is to engage in, or be capable of engaging in, the collection (and use) of information 
about one’s physical, social or phenomenological environment in ways that tend to 
produce representational states in one’s noetic structure (or, though perhaps only for 
linguistic animals, one’s belief system) that can then be used to assess the epistemic value 
(e.g. the truth or probable truth) of beliefs (or their analogues in non- or pre-linguistic 
animals) that are already in one’s noetic structure, or are at least being considered for 
inclusion (though not necessarily consciously considered). Minimally then, evidence is 
information both relevant to assessing the epistemic value (e.g. the truth, probable truth, 
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or falsity) of beliefs (or their analogues in non- or pre-linguistic animals) already, or 
potentially, in an individual's noetic structure and available to be so used by an evidence 
gatherer. My account of evidence is broad enough to include experience(s) and does not 
require meta-cognitive capacities (i.e., using new information to order, revise or reject 
beliefs one already holds need not involve meta-cognition). Even internalist 
epistemologists, who tend to be the most conservative of contemporary epistemologists, 
are not in total agreement about whether evidence use requires meta-cognition, and so 
my treatment here is neutral on that score.4   
Epistemic activity, on my account, is any cognitive activity (e.g., evidence 
gathering) that results in beliefs (or their analogues for non- or pre-linguistic animals) 
that, due to this activity, have varying degrees of positive epistemic status. Minimally, 
this involves the processing of information, ranking the resulting beliefs (or their relevant 
analogues for non- or pre-linguistic animals) using values of an epistemic nature relative 
to the individual’s continuing environmental feedback, and manipulating these resulting 
beliefs (or their relevant analogues for non- or pre-linguistic animals) in ways that affect 
the individual’s future behaviour. On my account, epistemic activity neither requires 
meta-cognitive capacity nor does it implicate phenomenally conscious states though it 
does implicate a to-be-specified degree of sensitivity and responsiveness to 
environmental feedback.5 
On chimpanzee hunters (of knowledge) and (evidence) gatherers 
The claim that chimpanzees engage, with some degree of sensitivity and responsiveness, 
in activities which can be appropriately described as gathering evidence has a degree of 
prima facie plausibility, and for the following reasons. First, chimpanzees begin life 
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lacking many of those skills that will, as they mature, be needed to find nourishment, 
protect themselves from the aggressive behaviour of conspecifics, find mates, and so on.6 
Young chimpanzees will acquire some of these skills while observing the behaviour of 
older conspecifics, including their mothers (Gómez 2004: 18-19, Hauser 2000: 35, 135-
36; Russon 1997: 175, 184-85). To accomplish this in the context of tool use, these young 
apes attend to the activities of others around them, and not only respond to the relevant 
stimuli, which itself will probably reflect innate dispositions to find certain stimuli 
attractive, but combine certain objects in ways that resemble what they have just 
observed (Hauser 2000: 135; Parker 1996: 351, 352-55; Matsuzawa 1996: 201-03; 
Matsuzawa and Yamakoshi 1996: 215, 217, 226-29). Think here of very young 
chimpanzees who will re-insert a discarded probe into a termite nest after the mother has 
finished feeding at that particular site.7 To acquire some of these skills in the context of 
social interactions, these young apes learn, among other things, which behaviours 
precede, or tend to precede, aggressive activity and which do not, which chimpanzees are 
more dominant than others, which male chimpanzee is the most dominant, and which 
individuals are a part of the ‘range community’ and which are not (de Waal 1987: 421-
29; de Waal and Aureli 1996: 86-87, 88-89; Fruth et al 1999: 66-67, 69; McGrew 2004: 
131, 157-59; Nishida and Hiraiwa-Hasegawa 1987: 167-70, 171-72, 174-76).8 These 
features of their social environment are not fixed, and so a degree of sensitivity and 
responsiveness to, say, changes in the social hierarchy are required if they are to 
successfully navigate this environment.  
Second, chimpanzees, as well as bonobos, have demonstrated a remarkable ability 
to acquire proto-linguistic, or perhaps weak linguistic, skills within artificial settings 
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(Fouts and Fouts 1999: 252-55; Gómez 2004: 277-91; Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh 
1990/94: 541-43, 545-71, 572-74). Think here of Loulis’ ability to sign to other 
chimpanzees or human attendants (Fouts and Fouts 1999: 253-54, 255) or Ai’s ability to 
reliably respond to various lexigrams or Japanese kanji (Matsuzawa 2002: 191-95). When 
these skills have not be moulded, the relevant individuals seem to have acquired the skills 
through observation and perhaps imitation (Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 1994: 135-42; 
Matsuzawa 2002: 192, 194).  
Taken together, these facts about chimpanzees suggest that they are evidence 
gatherers. A closer examination of these facts about chimpanzees, then, is warranted. 
Several points bear mention before delving deeper, however. (i) A sensitivity and 
responsiveness to environmental feedback is an important part of efficient learning 
(Saidel 1998: 1, 2, 3-5, 7-8). (ii) The learning that is of interest to me here need not 
involve imitation or what psychologists call ‘insight’ (Byrne 1995: 45-48). Even 
instrumental learning can be epistemically significant, though perhaps only if the relevant 
organism remains sensitive or responsive to their environment after having learned 
certain behaviour (Byrne 1995: 56-62). (iii) When information from environmental 
feedback positively or negatively affects the status of information already stored in an 
animal’s central nervous system (i.e., the information states already possessed by the 
relevant animal), this newly acquired information arguably qualifies as evidence (or plays 
an evidentiary role). This may seem to be too loose a sense of evidence, or by implication 
evidence gathering, but we need to pause and reflect on what qualifies as the possession 
of evidence, or evidence gathering capacity, among human conspecifics, who, when 
developed enough, are quintessential evidence gatherers and users. Think here of the 
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evidence gathering capacity of young human children. As human children experiment 
with objects or the relations of objects in their environments (e.g. striking two toys 
together or fitting them into various boxes/containers or dropping them in water), they are 
in effect gathering information about these objects or their relations with other objects 
and the regularities associated with these objects’ relationships (Crain 1992: 173-74, 322-
23; Tomasello and Call 1997: 59, 68-71, 97). This information serves as grounds for 
future responses to, or inferences about, similar objects or relations in their environment, 
even affecting what future information is taken to be relevant in responding, or making 
inferences useful, to a task at hand (Langer 1996: 263-65, 266-67; Santrock 2001: 238, 
257-58, 259-60). The activities I have just described are widely regarded as evidence 
gathering, and taken as an indication of an evidence gathering capacity in the individual 
engaged in them.  
Let us now return to some of the facts about chimpanzees I listed earlier. Consider 
a common tool-using activity among wild chimpanzees—termite fishing. Several points 
are noteworthy. (1) Chimpanzees who forage for termites in termite nests typically do not 
do so year round, their foraging behaviour is correlated with the seasonal activities of 
termites (see, for example, Goodall 1988/97: 74-75). Here we see a hint of selective 
behaviour, though it is not sufficient to suggest that this behaviour is not driven by 
environmental contingencies. (2) That this foraging behaviour is not simply an expression 
of a set behavioural pattern or a predisposed response to a particular stimulus is strongly 
suggested by the facts that (i) not all chimpanzees – even from the same sub-species in 
similar ecological conditions – will hunt termites and (ii) not all chimpanzees – even 
from the same sub-species in similar ecological conditions – hunt the same species of 
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termite (Matsuzawa and Yamakoshi 1996: 219; McGrew 1994/96: 30-31; McGrew 2004: 
113; Sanz et al 2004: 567-68). (3) Importantly, before beginning to forage at a nest, a 
chimpanzee will first investigate the level of its activity. She does this by disturbing the 
nest structure and observing the reaction of the resident termites. Enough activity will 
incline her to dip a grass blade or thin twig – denuded of protruding leaves – into the nest 
(Sanz et al 2004: 574). (4) What community this chimpanzee belongs to is a relatively 
reliable indicator of what material substrate she will use for termite fishing (McGrew 
2004: 111-13) and how she removes the termites from the probe is a weak indicator of 
how conspecifics around her have done this in the past (McGrew 1994/96: 31-32). (5) 
The chimpanzee infant typically spends a significant part of the waking day clinging to 
the body of her mother. Often attentive to what is happening around her, the infant seems 
to at least sometimes watch the mother foraging for termites, including her preparation of 
the probe and how she removes the termites upon extracting the probe from the nest. As 
the infant matures, becoming physically mobile and moving about in the vicinity of the 
mother, she will probably pick up a discarded probe and, with enough time taken in the 
past to exploring such an object’s features, begin to insert it into holes left by the 
mother’s foraging (Lonsdorf 2006: 36-37, 42-43).9 
As the infant learns termite fishing technique, either by watching conspecifics or 
exploring the nest with a discarded probe, she processes a good deal of information about 
her own body, the termite nest structure, termites, probes, how to extract a probe without 
losing a lot of termites and how to extract the termites without getting bitten. This 
information processing, it is reasonable to suppose, yields, among other things, a to-be-
specified number of information, affective and conative states that will have an affect on 
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the future behaviour of this maturing ape. It is also reasonable to suppose that, as the 
infant matures, new information obtained in play or ‘practice’ will inform the direction 
the infant takes in manipulating objects in her environment, even inclining her to adopt 
new ways of accomplishing old tasks (e.g. new ways of holding twigs, better ways to 
prepare the probe for insertion into a termite nest, how to insert the probe into a nest and 
so on). Here evidence gathering and use, as I characterized it above, seems to be at work 
early on in a chimpanzee’s life. 
Consider further some chimpanzee stone tool use. In certain parts of West Africa, 
some of the members of Pan troglodytes verus will forage for nuts using hammers and 
anvils to break open the casing of oil palm, coula or panda nuts (Matsuzawa 1994/96: 
353; McGrew 2004: 118-20). Anvils will be any hard surface (e.g. rock, tree root or tree 
trunk) that can both hold the nut and provide resistance to the force of the hammer used 
by the chimpanzee. Hammers are typically rocks used to strike, and break open, the nut 
casing (Matsuzawa 1994/96: 356-60; McGrew 1994/96: 35; McGrew 2004: 118). To 
explain this behaviour we need to posit causally efficacious information, affective and 
conative states—no other explanations seem adequate to the task. Young chimpanzees 
learn to successfully use stone tools between the ages of three and five, but it takes 
“almost ten years to acquire the refined level of skill shown by adults” (Matsuzawa 
1994/96: 367). Clearly, this is a case of learned behaviour, rather than the result of a fixed 
action pattern or even the combination of fixed actions as a conditioned response to the 
right physical stimulus (what some might call ‘innate behaviour’). Not all chimpanzees 
use stone (or wood) tools in this way, only the subspecies Pan troglodytes verus (in West 
Africa) (McGrew 1994/96: 33), and not all members of the subspecies Pan troglodytes 
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verus engage in nut cracking behaviour (McGrew 1994/96: 30). This behaviour is not 
ecologically determined. The rocks (or wood) and nuts are available in habitats 
frequented by a least one of the other subspecies of chimpanzee (e.g. Pan troglodytes 
troglodytes), but only Pan troglodytes verus exhibit nut-cracking abilities (McGrew 
1994/96: 35). It seems to be a pattern of behaviour that chimpanzees can learn to apply 
through the example of others. A female chimpanzee (‘named’ Yo), in a community of 
chimpanzees who did not break open coula nuts,10 immediately did so when a study area 
watched by a group of primatologists was seeded with coula and oil-palm nuts 
(Matsuzawa 1994/96: 364). The other adults of this community, who witnessed Yo crack 
open the coula nuts and eat the kernels, showed little interest in doing the same 
(Matsuzawa 1994/96: 364; Matsuzawa 1996: 202). Some of the younger chimpanzees, 
however, gathered around to watch Yo break the coula nuts’ casing and consume the 
kernels. In the days that followed, two of these juveniles copied Yo’s behaviour, 
obtaining and eventually consuming the nut’s kernel (Matsuzawa 1994/96: 364-65, 367; 
Matsuzawa 1996: 202). Note that the adults in the group did not begin to mimic the 
female in question (Matsuzawa 1994/96: 364, 367; Matsuzawa 1996: 203). So, whatever 
the source of this behaviour, it does not arise as a result of mere stimulus enhancement.  
Also take note that Yo did not learn this behaviour in the group of which she was 
now a member, nor was she disposed to break open any nut or nut-like object 
encountered in a feeding area. A year after the aforementioned experiment was 
conducted, an area frequented by this group of chimpanzees was seeded with wooden 
balls that resembled coula nuts in both shape and size. Yo, though not the aforementioned 
curious juveniles, ignored these wooden balls (Matsuzawa 1996: 202). It would appear, 
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then, that this chimpanzee possessed information about particular nuts that were not 
normally in her environment and, when the opportunity arose, used this information to 
obtain some food. Just in these two incidents alone we have the presence of causally 
efficacious information, affective and conative states that contribute to Yo’s foraging and 
which are selectively used to accomplish this. 
 Once more, evidence gathering is evident in this type of behaviour. In Yo’s case, 
she is sensitive to certain features of various small nut-like objects in her surrounding 
environment. Before using a stone to break a small nut-like object, that object must 
relevantly resemble nuts she has broken open in the past. Arguably, Yo is using already 
stored information (i.e. memories of some past experience) and comparing it to 
information recently received from her senses and then using a positive correlation as 
evidence that an edible object is in her field of vision. None of this need happen at the 
level of awareness nor need it be realized as a syllogism to qualify as evidence gathering 
or use. It is this kind of evidence gathering and use that is surely the more prevalent form 
at work in human daily affairs.  
As I have just stated, it takes young chimpanzees seven years or more to acquire 
the nut-cracking skill of experienced adults (Matsuzawa 1994/96: 367). Matsuzawa has 
noted that there are at least three developmental stages in a young chimpanzee’s ability to 
forage for nuts using stone tools. He writes, 
First is the action manipulating a single object, such as a nut or a stone 
….Second is the action of relating two objects; a nut and a stone, or a 
stone and another stone. Third is coordinating the multiple actions of 
manipulated objects (Matsuzawa 1996: 201). 
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As the young chimpanzee matures, she can be observed first playing with individual nuts 
or stones, or taking a kernel for consumption from off her mother’s anvil after her mother 
broke open a nut’s casing. After a time, she begins rolling a nut off her mother’s anvil or 
pushing one stone against another. She might even try hitting the nut with her hand while 
the nut is either on the ground or is sitting on a stone, clearly emulating the behaviour of 
older chimpanzees around her. She might, instead, strike a nut against a root, trunk or 
stone. After a time, she will begin to strike the nut with a stone, and learn to place the nut 
onto a stone or other hard substrate before she strikes it (Matsuzawa 1994/96: 356-59). 
Again, all of this behaviour requires a to-be-specified amount of information processing, 
including the integration of new information over time about individual objects, relations 
between objects, and her own body relevant to developing the skills required for breaking 
open nut casings. This all seems to relevantly resemble what I described earlier when 
talking about the evidence gathering activities of young humans. Young chimpanzees 
appear to be evidence gatherers and users. Coupled with the reasonable suspicion that 
these young apes also possess a to-be-specified number of information states which 
inform, in conjunction with various affective or conative states, their interactions with 
nuts, stones or other material substrates, we can reasonably hold that these young 
chimpanzees already resemble epistemic subjects. 
I mentioned earlier that chimpanzees must learn various social skills if they are to 
successfully navigate their social environments. Within the context of their social 
interactions there are suggestions of evidence gathering and use. One common ‘practice’ 
among chimpanzees who have been victims of recent aggression is the insertion of a 
finger of the victim, typically the subordinate, into the mouth of the one who behaved 
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aggressively, typically the more dominant chimpanzee (de Waal 1990/96: 80). This is a 
risky behaviour. Chimpanzees have been known to bite off digits, or worse, in moments 
of aggression (de Waal 1990/96: 60, 80). How is the behaviour to be construed? It seems 
to play an evidentiary role in revealing the present disposition of the relevant conspecific. 
A positive response to the finger insertion leads to a relaxing of the victim, with 
grooming often ensuing (de Waal 1990/96: 40-41, 43, 80). Arguably, the positive 
response is taken as evidence that the aggressor is not going to behave aggressively for 
the time being, or something to that affect.  
A second area rich in suggestive examples of evidence gathering in a social 
context concerns the acquisition and use of information about chimpanzee social 
hierarchy. As I mentioned earlier, the social hierarchy within chimpanzee groups is 
flexible—something that is not uncommon among primates (including, of course, 
humans) (de Waal 1994/96: 248; McGrew 2004: 157-59). Among the males, one 
chimpanzee enjoys alpha status, typically giving him, among other things, first access to 
common food, a good deal of uninterrupted access to sexually receptive females, and a 
certain ‘license’ to express himself aggressively to conspecifics within the group (i.e. 
aggressive behaviour will not typically result in retaliation from others within the group) 
(McGrew 2004: 157). This status is not achieved or maintained on brute strength alone, 
so that it is not always the strongest or biggest chimpanzee male that ‘ascends’ to alpha 
status. It is not uncommon to find (more longer term) alliances or (shorter term) 
coalitions11 that maintain a male’s dominance over the group (de Waal 1990/96: 49, 50-
51; McGrew 2004: 157-59). Evidence of a male’s dominance resides, at least in part, in 
the periodic repetition of submissive behaviour of others within the group. A male who 
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approaches a more dominant male will typically exhibit submissive behaviour. This 
seems to consist of rather stereotyped behaviour, including a relatively low approach to 
the more dominant male and the vocalization of certain sounds christened “submissive 
grunts” (de Waal 1990/96: 44-45, 52-53). Such behaviour reveals the relative status of 
two interacting chimpanzees, and other chimpanzees observing this behaviour seem 
attuned to its significance. Changes in the social hierarchy (e.g. the fall in status of one 
male and the rise of another) can be evidenced by the change in the frequency of 
submissive behaviour between previously dominant and subordinate chimpanzees and the 
rise of behaviour among conspecifics that is uncharacteristic of the past hierarchy—e.g. 
approaching sexually receptive females despite the agitation, or aggressive responses, of 
the ‘current’ alpha male, or more straight forward aggressive behaviour directed towards 
the ‘current’ alpha male (see de Waal 1990/96: 50, 52, 57-61, 63-69). Young and old 
alike, in order to avoid becoming victims of aggression, must learn the social significance 
of such behavioural changes or expressions of submission.  
It is reasonable to suppose that a chimpanzee who observes such behavioural 
changes, or expressions of submission, is storing information about the social hierarchy 
of the group that can be used in future behaviour. This stored information will consist of 
a to-be-specified number of information states which, in conjunction with various 
affective or conative states, can incline an individual to behave submissively or 
aggressively when approaching a particular conspecific in possession of some food or 
pursuing a sexually receptive female. The pay off will be the avoidance of personal injury 
– or the continuation of a relatively peaceful day – or the continued possession of, or 
access to, various resources.  
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What is more, the relevant information states concerning the dominance ranking 
within the relevant group will have to change over time, and sometimes very quickly, to 
keep up with the changes in social hierarchy. A chimpanzee that is too inattentive may 
find themselves on the ‘wrong side’ of a fight over, say, a common food source. Past 
experience being the victim of aggressive behaviour by an ‘up and coming’ male no 
doubt ‘teaches’ chimpanzees to stay attuned to such changing interactions within the 
group. Once again, there is good reason to think that chimpanzees are evidence gatherers 
and users and with a not insignificant degree of sensitivity or responsiveness to changing 
circumstances in their environment. 
The other examples with which I began this section can all receive the kind of 
analysis I just gave, but I do not think that this is necessary to defend the claim that 
chimpanzees are evidence gatherers and users. What I have just provided is sufficient to 
defend this claim. 
Knowing success 
Arguably, the most fertile ground for finding clear and strong evidence of epistemic 
success is skilled behaviour. It is reasonable to think that skilled behaviour consists of (i) 
coordinated (ii) goal-directed behaviour that an organism has (iii) learned during its 
ontogeny, that (iv) requires a non-haphazard application of past experience in (v) 
successfully achieving a desired end, and (vi) involves ends that are themselves selected 
by the organism12 in question (vii) based upon its past experience and preferences.13 This 
analysis of skilled behaviour distinguishes it from the mere expression of genetically 
determined predispositions of the kind encountered in the behaviour of digger wasps 
(Gould and Gould 1994/99: 39-43) or sphex wasps (Dennett 1984: 11) without excluding 
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associative or instrumental learning as a component of skilled behaviour—learning that 
we even see in some of the skilled behaviour of humans (Crain 1992: 165). 
For the sake of brevity I will focus on the example of chimpanzee stone tool use 
discussed in the previous section (though what I have already discussed in that section 
implies both skilled behaviour and epistemic success). Several features of this activity are 
noteworthy. (1) Chimpanzee nut-cracking behaviour is learned (Matsuzawa 1994/96: 
356-59). (2) It requires the presence of causally efficacious information states about the 
relevant species of nut, the utility of the relevant tools for the task at hand, and the 
desirability of a certain end (e.g. the acquisition of the relevant nut kernel) in the relevant 
individual's noetic structure (see Matsuzawa 1996: 202-03). (3) These information states 
enjoy a certain prominence in the individual’s noetic structure in the relevant foraging 
context (after all, they, rather than competing information states about other sources of 
nourishment and the means to procure them, inform the behaviour of the foraging 
chimpanzee in a ‘nut-cracking context’). (4) These information states enjoy their 
aforementioned prominence in the relevant chimpanzee’s noetic structure in the face of 
ongoing feedback from that chimpanzee’s physical environment. 
The behaviour of Yo and some of the juvniles in her group, mentioned in the 
previous section, seem to clinch the matter. Remember, of the adults in her group, only 
Yo immediately placed a seeded coula nut on an anvil, broke open its shell, retrieved the 
kernel and consumed it. Two juveniles watched her behaviour, and in the days that 
followed were observed successfully retrieving a coula nut kernel from each of the nuts 
they cracked, though they initially spat them out after only briefly tasting them 
(Matsuzawa 1996: 202).  
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What does this set of observations show? First, Yo seems to have possessed 
information states with content identifying coula nuts as a food source that contains an 
edible core. This is suggested not just by her apparently lone appreciation of seeded coula 
nuts as something that both could be broken open and contained an edible kernel, but her 
eagerness to eat the nut kernels, something the younger chimpanzees were not initially 
willing to do (presumably because of the difference in taste from the oil-palm nuts) 
(Matsuzawa 1996: 202). Second, knowledge – or something akin to it – can be 
‘transmitted’ from one generation to the next.14 This is not only relevant to the 
chimpanzee culture debate (see de Waal 2001: 227-29; Gómez 2004: 249-65; McGrew 
2001: 248 for examples), but is relevant to analytic epistemologists interested in the 
history or scope of social knowledge (see Longino (2002); Schmitt (1994)). Third, it 
suggests that at least some chimpanzees are sensitive to the information possessed by 
others. Here, then, we seem to see acquired information effecting the behaviour of 
chimpanzees, and within a context of action requiring skilled behaviour. 
Did Yo also engage in epistemic – and not ‘merely’ evaluative – activity using 
epistemic standards she had adopted? As I stated in (4) above, these information states 
enjoy prominence in the relevant chimpanzee’s noetic structure in the face of ongoing 
feedback from that chimpanzee’s physical environment. Each time Yo engages in nut-
cracking behaviour she receives further reinforcement from her success. In other words, 
the relevant, causally efficacious information states receive ongoing positive feedback 
when Yo succeeds in obtaining an edible kernel from breaking open the relevant nut. 
Presumably, this means that Yo is more inclined to use these information states in 
relevantly similar circumstances in the future. These facts about Yo’s nut-cracking 
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behaviour, and the continuing prominence of certain information states conducive to this 
behaviour, speaks to the accuracy of the relevant information states. As accuracy is a 
straightforwardly epistemic value, there is an epistemic value at work in the cognitive 
activity required for Yo to break open nut casings.  
We can see evidence of a contrary instance of information states that lack this 
degree of accuracy in the behaviour of the juveniles who had copied Yo in breaking the 
coula nut casings. As I briefly mentioned in the previous section, a year after the 
aforementioned experiment was conducted, an area frequented by this group of 
chimpanzees was seeded with wooden balls that resembled coula nuts in both shape and 
size. Yo, though not the aforementioned curious juveniles, ignored these wooden balls 
(Matsuzawa 1996: 202). Matsuzawa writes, 
The youngsters … seemed ready to crack any objects resembling edible 
nuts even if the objects were unfamiliar. Their attempts to crack open 
wooden balls may reveal an abiding tendency to try to crack open 
unfamiliar nut-like objects which was facilitated by their observing Yo’s 
cracking new nuts in the last year (Matsuzawa 1996: 202). 
Interestingly, these juveniles appeared to possess causally efficacious information states 
that, unlike Yo’s, lacked a certain accuracy. Perhaps better yet, these youngsters 
possessed rules of action that allowed information states with a degree of inaccuracy to 
enjoy a prominence in their respective noetic structures while engaging in nut-cracking-
behaviour. Presumably, this was registered by the juveniles upon receiving negative 
feedback from their attempts to break open the wooden balls.  
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Important to my point here is that accuracy of the relevant, causally efficacious 
information states is important to the success of these chimpanzees, and that at least some 
of these animals favour accurate information states over time and, in so doing, in effect 
track their truth or falsity. At any rate, accuracy is a value clearly at work in this kind of 
behaviour, at least some of the time, and since it is clearly an epistemic value evinces (i) 
the existence of chimpanzee epistemic activities and (ii) information states that meet the 
epistemic standards (at least concerning accuracy) adopted by these chimpanzees 
themselves. Consequently, this example of chimpanzee skilled behaviour supports the 
claim that chimpanzees can, and sometimes do, achieve a degree of epistemic success 
while engaging in epistemic activity.  
In this section I have provided an example of skilled chimpanzee behaviour that 
suggests or implies that these animals engage in epistemic activities, and that these 
activities track the accuracy of the relevant information states that inform the subsequent 
skilled behaviour. If this is right, I have shown not only that chimpanzees are evidence 
gatherers, but that they can achieve a degree of epistemic success while engaging in 
epistemic activity. 
On why this matters 
The importance of these observations partially resides in their implications for both future 
work in chimpanzee cognitive studies and naturalized epistemology. There is enough data 
on chimpanzee cognition and behaviour for naturalized epistemologists to now begin to 
contribute analyses of knowledge, as it is understood philosophically, with the express 
intention of developing an account of knowledge, and epistemic activity, of use to 
primatologists that reflects the active cognitive activities of such nonhuman primates as 
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chimpanzees. This offers primatologists a way of moving beyond metaphor or perhaps 
even analogy, and ascribing knowledge to chimpanzees in the relevantly similar sense in 
which we ascribe knowledge to ourselves. By recognizing chimpanzees as epistemic 
subjects, and recognizing in at least some of their behaviour epistemic activities, we 
deepen the picture of what it means for animals to be actively cognitively engaged with 
their physical or social environments. This also deepens our shared understanding of 
epistemic subjectivity and offers a way of exploring its evolutionary history.  
In contrast to either reliabilism or the anthropocentric stance mentioned earlier, 
what I offer here is another way of understanding chimpanzees as knowers. Arguably, 
these animals engage in epistemic activities: that is, goal-directed activities governed by 
rules evincing values (and goals) of an epistemic nature. These activities, and the relevant 
values, ought to figure in future naturalistic analyses of knowledge or, perhaps, other 
forms of positive epistemic status. Up until now, and with few exceptions, the epistemic 
activities and values informing the development and defence of theories of positive 
epistemic status, or epistemic subjectivity, have been human (in particular, the activities 
and values of mature, properly functioning, adult humans).This has tended to yield 
analyses of positive epistemic status or epistemic subjectivity that require sophisticated 
cognitive capacities (see Bonjour 2002; Rescher 2001; Steup 2003). Reliabilist 
epistemologies are an exception here, though they still tend to prioritize human epistemic 
activities and values when developing or defending their analyses (see Goldman 1976; 
Goldman 1988; Kornblith 1999). Indeed, reliability of beliefs, or belief forming 
mechanisms or processes, is a recognizable epistemic value to human epistemic subjects. 
Arguably, this explains the persuasiveness of reliablist epistemologies. Even here, then, 
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the values informing naturalized theories of positive epistemic status bear the mark of 
their human origins. Contemporary work in chimpanzee cognitive studies offers 
naturalized epistemologists a chance to correct this bias. 
Conclusions 
I have provided examples of chimpanzee evidence gathering and, what might be 
described as, epistemic success. This strongly implies that chimpanzees engage in 
epistemic activities, identifying them as epistemic subjects markedly similar to ourselves. 
If chimpanzees are properly regarded as epistemic subjects, this has some significant 
consequences for both contemporary research in chimpanzee cognitive studies and 
naturalized epistemology. Naturalized epistemologists now have the data needed to begin 
to develop analyses of positive epistemic status, and even epistemic subjectivity, that are 
sensitive to the epistemic activities of, and implicit epistemic values held by, 
chimpanzees. This will be of use in tracking bona fide examples of chimpanzee epistemic 
activity in free-living or captive chimpanzee populations, and understanding how 
knowledge, understood philosophically, affects the behaviour of some animals other than 
humans. This also deepens our shared understanding of epistemic subjectivity and offers 
a way of exploring its evolutionary history. It may also enable naturalized 
epistemologists to effectively move beyond anthropocentric epistemic frameworks, 
properly putting the nature back into naturalized epistemology. 
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Notes 
 
1  In arguing that chimpanzees are good candidates for substantive epistemic 
subjects I have been influenced by a distinction, found in the literature on animal 
cognition, between active and passive knowing or active and passive cognition (see 
Gould and Gould 1994/99: 8, 87, 114, 120, 126). Gould and Gould describe this 
distinction as follows, 
Cognition can be innate – passive knowledge encoded in an animal’s 
genes and used as instructions for wiring a nervous system to generate 
particular inborn abilities and specializations. Active cognition – the 
ongoing process of gathering, analyzing, and using knowledge – can 
incorporate several stages of mental processing beginning with sensation, 
which is the detection of stimuli by a sensory receptor organ and the 
subsequent processing of that sensory information by the brain. … It is the 
processing and analysis of sensory information that engenders knowledge, 
which can then be stored, recalled, and used in decision-making (Gould 
and Gould 1994/99: 8). 
To be a substantive epistemic subject on my account is to qualify as an active 
knower on Gould’s and Gould’s account. 
2  I understand Bertrand Russell to be offering a realist analogical approach in 
Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. His discussion of knowledge possessed by a 
dog on pages 182 and 446-447 resembles what I am describing here. Russell’s discussion 
of animal belief on pages 109 and 110 are also relevant here. In contrast, Donald 
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Davidson allows that we ascribe knowledge to other animals analogically without 
granting the realist position. Davidson writes,  
[a]gainst the dependence of thought on language is the plain observation 
that we succeed in explaining and sometimes predicting, the behavior of 
languageless animals by attributing beliefs and desires and intentions to 
them. This method works for dogs and frogs much as it does for people. 
And, it may be added, we have no general and practical alternative 
framework for explaining animal behavior (Davidson 1982: 323). 
He goes on, 
But there would be a clear sense in which it would be wrong to conclude 
that dumb … animals have propositional attitudes. To see this it is only 
necessary to reflect that someone might easily have no better or alternative 
way of explaining the movements of a heat-seeking missile than to 
suppose the missile wanted to destroy an airplane and believed it could by 
moving in the way it was observed to move. This uninformed observer 
might be justified in attributing a desire and beliefs to the missile; but he 
would be wrong (Davidson 1982: 323). 
This, I think, nicely illustrates the application of a non-realist analogical approach. 
3  Kornblith uses some of Carolyn Ristau’s work on the piping plover to try and 
show the applicability of his account (Kornblith 2002: 53-55). Unfortunately, it is clear 
from Ristau’s own comments on the significance of the cognitive vocabulary she uses 
when explaining and describing the behaviour of her nonhuman animal subjects that she 
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thinks that her subjects possess knowledge, and that it is reasonable to think this because 
they seem to be cognitively engaged with their environment (i.e. that, as believers, they 
are sufficiently sensitive and responsive to their environment to be, in some important 
sense, epistemic subjects) (see Ristau 1991a: 93, 124; Ristau 1991b: 309-10). 
4  This sense of evidence and evidence gathering reflects how Bonjour and Steup, to 
name just two examples, seem to understand them (see Bonjour 2002: 39-43 and Steup 
2003: 313-14). Steup is clear, however, that evidence gathering and use involves meta-
cognition, at least if it is to be epistemically significant (Steup 2003: 314). Bonjour is, I 
think, in general agreement here, though he is less explicit about it (see Bonjour 2002: 41, 
224-26). Bonjour’s own admission, however, that (i) it is reasonable to suppose that 
many humans, including children, possess knowledge or justified beliefs and (ii) this is 
acquired without engaging in meta-cognition (Bonjour 2002: 225, 226) appears to imply 
that Bonjour is at least willing to concede that evidence gathering and use does not 
require meta-cognition—a concession Steup seems unwilling to make (Steup 2003: 314). 
Nicholas Rescher is an internalist epistemologist whose understanding of evidence 
gathering clearly requires meta-cognition (see Rescher 2001: 14-16, 19-20). Audi is a 
dissenting voice here, in that, though an internalist epistemologist, he does not think it is 
plausible to hold that meta-cognition is necessary for evidence gathering or use. 
Interestingly, Audi’s rejection of what he calls second-order internalism – nicely 
exemplified by the likes of Steup or Rescher – is at least partially based upon the 
plausibility of talking of the justified beliefs of young humans who have as yet to develop 
extensive conceptual frameworks (see Audi 1989: 309, 311). 
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5  In the philosophical literature, the sensitivity and resposiveness of animals to 
environmental feedback figures in contexts related to this one. See Allen (1999) and 
Kornblith (2004). 
6  This is generally true of nonhuman primates (Strier 2000: 255-56, 263, 266-71) 
7  There are videos associated with Sanz et al (2004) that can be viewed when 
accessing it through The American Naturalist online. Video 1, titled “Chimpanzees 
Approaching Nest”, appears to show a young chimpanzee copying the behaviour of his 
mother as she forages for termites. 
8  A very general description of the kinds of social knowledge developed by 
individual nonhuman primates can be found in Ray (1999) or Chapter 7 of Tomasello and 
Call (1997). 
9  Again see the videos associated with Sanz et al (2004) which can be viewed when 
accessing it through The American Naturalist online. 
10  Members of the community in Bossou of which she was a part did crack open 
nuts, but only oil-palm nuts (Matsuzawa 1994/96: 364). 
11  Coalitions are described as “two or more individuals joining forces against one or 
more conspecific rivals” (Nishida and Hosaka 1996: 114). Alliances are coalitions that 
survive for a lengthy period of time within a given community (though the amount of 
time required for a coalition to qualify as an alliance is, as far as I know, unspecified) 
(Nishida and Hosaka 1996: 114). Coalitions seem to be contrasted with alliances both 
because of their brevity of existence and opportunistic character (Nishida and Hosaka 
1996: 114). 
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12  Once again, these do not have to be consciously chosen nor do the ends need to be 
non-species specific or in some important sense idiosyncratic. That is to say, even ends 
that arise out of what an animal is predisposed to find salient will qualify as ends selected 
by this animal in the relevant way. 
13  Arguably something like this notion of skilled behaviour underlies James and 
Carol Gould’s discussions of learning and insight (see Gould and Gould 1999: 65-67, 68-
87, 100-13). 
14  Note that I need no other learning mechanisms at work here than stimulus 
enhancement and instrumental learning. Even if these, and not more social learning, 
mechanisms best explain how the juveniles began to acquire the skills associated with 
cracking open coula nuts, they still acquired knowledge (or something akin to it) of the 
edibility of coula nuts similar to the knowledge (or something akin to it) possessed by Yo 
and only learned of this property of coula nuts from observing Yo’s foraging behaviour. 
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